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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

]
]

Plaintiff-Respondent,

i
]

vs.

Case No. 870350-CA

SIGIFREDO EDUARDO SIERRA,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
The
established

by

jurisdiction

of the Utah

78-2a-3(2)(e), Utah

Court

of Appeals

Code Annotated,

is

1953, as

amended.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of Possession of a
Controlled

Substance with Intent to Distribute

for Value, a

Second Degree Felony.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the highway patrolman who stopped the Defendant's
vehicle do so with reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant's
vehicle and conduct an investigation or was the stop made as a
pretext

to

conduct

further

investigation

of

this

particular

vehicle and Defendant?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE^
The Statutes believed to be determinative in this case
are 41-6-53 and 77-7-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
1

The

statutes

are

set

forth

hereinafter

as

they

now

read.

41-6-53, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, was amended by
House Bill 231 of the 1987 legislature and became effective on
April 27, 1987.

A copy of the Bill is attached in the addendum

hereto, but the Appellant does not claim, that the alterations of
the Statute are relevant to the issues on appeal.

41-6-53. Duty to operate vehicle on right side
of roadway - Exceptions.
(1) On all roadways of sufficient width,
a vehicle shall be operated upon the right half
of the roadway, except:
(a)
When overtaking and passing
another vehicle proceeding in the same
direction under the rules governing that
movement;
(b)
When an obstruction requires
operating the vehicle to the left of the center
of the roadway, but the operator shall yield
the right-of-way to all vehicles traveling in
proper direction upon the unobstructed portions
of the highway within a distance constituting
an immediate hazard;
(c) on a roadway divided into three
marked lanes for traffic under the applicable
rules; or
(d)
on a roadway designed and
signposted for one-way traffic.
(2) On all roadways a vehicle proceeding
at less than the normal speed of traffic under
the existing conditions shall be operated in
the right-hand lane then available for traffic,
or as close as practicable to the right-hand
curb or edge of the roadway, except when
overtaking and passing another vehicle
preceeding in the same direction or when
preparing for a left turn at an intersection or
into a private road or driveway.
77-7-15.
Authority of peace officer to stop
and question suspect - Grounds.
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has reasonable suspicion
to believe he has committed or is in the act of

2

committing or is attempting to commit a public
offense and may demand his name, address and an
explanation of his actions.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of Possession of a
Controlled

Substance with Intent to Distribute

Second Degree Felony.
determination

for Value, a

The decision in this case will turn on the

of the reasonableness of a highway patrolman's

investigatory stop of a vehicle on the interstate freeway south
of Cedar City, Utah.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The

Defendant

was

arrested

on

March

6,

1987.

A

Preliminary Hearing was held on April 8, 1987, and the Defendant
was bound over to the District Court for trial.

The Defendant

filed a Motion to Suppress the cocaine seized at the time of his
arrest on the grounds that the stop made by the highway patrol
trooper was pretextual in nature.

The District Court based its

decision upon the Preliminary Hearing for the reason that the
Honorable J. Phillip Eves conducted the Preliminary Hearing as
the Ninth Circuit Court Judge and then was appointed to the Fifth
District Court bench and presided at the district court level as
well.

The Court denied the Motion to Suppress and thereafter the

Defendant entered a plea of no contest.
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
After entry of the plea of no contest, the Defendant
requested immediate sentencing and the Court imposed a sentence
of not less than one nor more that fifteen years at the Utah
3

State Prison.

No fine was imposed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On March 6, 1987, at 2:57 p.m., Officer Kirk Smith of
the Utah Highway Patrol was traveling

on Interstate

Fifteen

northbound near milepost 20 which is in the vicinity of Leeds,
Utah

(Preliminary Hearing Transcript, 6) .

At that time and

place Trooper Smith saw a vehicle with New York license plates in
front of him.

Trooper Smith passed the vehicle on the left-hand

side and noticed that the driver of the vehicle looked at the
trooper and "then quickly looked back away from me and kinda
bowed his head"

(T. 7) .

The Trooper then requested the Cedar

City dispatcher of the Utah Highway Patrol to run a computer
check of the vehicle to determine if it might be stolen.

At 3:09

p.m. the dispatcher replied to Trooper Smith that the vehicle was
not

stolen.

However, Trooper

Smith

testified,

"due

to

the

suspicious nature and the way the subject had reacted when he
seen (sic) me, I told Cedar that I was going to go after the
vehicle, that I was going to check the vehicle more closely, and
I asked if she had anybody in the area that she could send
someone to assist me with this vehicle"
7

and 8 are

accelerated

(T. 7) (Transcript pages

included in the Addendum) .

his vehicle

in order to

Trooper Smith then

find the car with the

New York license plate and traveled faster than the speed limit
in order to locate the vehicle

(T. 26) . Trooper Smith caught up

with the vehicle at milepost 49 which is located in Iron County,
and at the Preliminary Hearing he testified, "I decided I'd stop
4

this vehicle and explain to him our left-lane law"

(T. 8) .

Trooper Smith had followed the vehicle in the left-hand lane for
forty to fifty seconds as the vehicle traveled fifty-six miles
per hour and passed two other vehicles.

Trooper Smith testified

that the suspect car could have yielded on several occasions, but
remained in the left-hand lane
that

the

suspect

vehicle

(T. 27) . Trooper Smith testified

was

in

the

left-hand

lane

for

approximately ten seconds after passing the second of the two
cars before the Trooper turned on his red light and signaled the
vehicle to pull over

(T. 28).

At the Motion to Suppress Hearing on May 19, 1987, the
Defendant testified

that when the Highway

Patrolman saw him

initially that he looked at the speedometer but did not attempt
to

hide

his

Transcript,

face

4).

from

The

the

Trooper

Defendant

also

(Motion
testified

to
that

Suppress
he

was

traveling in the right-hand lane and was traveling at 55 miles to
56 miles per hour

( Motion to Suppress Transcript, 5).

Trooper Smith stopped the vehicle and asked Mr. Sierra
for his drivers license and the registration of the vehicle.
Mr. Sierra could not produce his drivers license but did present
the registration card

(T. 10).

Trooper Smith thereafter went through a detailed series
of investigative procedures which resulted in the arrest of the
Defendant and the issuance of a search warrant.

The vehicle was

taken to Cedar City, Utah, and the gas tank removed from the
vehicle.

A secret compartment was disclosed and fifteen taped
5

packages were removed which were found to contain 31.3 pounds of
cocaine that tested 96% pure

(T. 29) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is the Defendant-Appellant's

contention that the

highway patrol trooper had no reasonable suspicion to believe
that the Defendant-Appellant had committed or was in the act of
committing a public offense as set out in 77-7-15, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended.
The
officer's

Defendant-Appellant

intent

to

inform

also

the

contends

that

Defendant-Appellant

of

the
the

"left-lane law", 41-6-53, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
was used as a pretext by the officer to conduct an investigation
which otherwise could not be supported by reasonable suspicion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
TROOPER SMITH HAD NO REASONABLE SUSPICION TO BELIEVE
THAT THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS IN THE ACT OF
COMMITTING A PUBLIC OFFENSE.
The testimony at the Preliminary Hearing in this case
indicates

that

Trooper

Smith

became

curious

about

the

Defendant-Appellant and at 2:57 p.m. requested a computer check
on the vehicle to determine whether or not it was stolen.

At

3:09 p.m. the Trooper was informed that the vehicle was not
stolen.

However,

the

Trooper

determined

that

the

Defendant-Appellant had displayed a "suspicious nature" (T. 7)
and at that point determined that he should follow the vehicle
and thereafter traveled an additional 29 miles in order to "check
6

the vehicle more closely"
The

(T. 7).

constitutional

basis

for

statutes

similar

to

77-7-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, is originally
found in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1(1968).

Terry established the

proposition that an officer must have articulable facts upon
which he could base a reasonable suspicion which then would
support an investigatory stop of a suspect.

The Utah Supreme

Court has recently addressed the "reasonable suspicion" standard
of 77-7-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and found that
"reasonable suspicion" was not present in two separate cases.
STATE V. CARPENA, 714 P. 2d 647

In

(1986) the Utah Supreme Court

found that a car with an out-of-state license plate moving slowly
through a neighborhood late at night was not sufficient evidence
to

support

stop.

a

reasonable

suspicion

allowing

an

investigatory

In STATE V. SWANIGAN, 699 P.2d 718 (1985), our Court found

that an officer lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop a Defendant
and his companion when an officer had been told by a fellow
policeman that the Defendant and his companion had been walking
along a street at a late hour where recent burglaries had been
reported.
In the

instant

case, the

fact that

the

Defendant

"quickly looked back away from me and kinda bowed his head"
(T. 7)

cannot be seen as an articulable fact which would support

a reasonable suspicion that the Defendant was engaged in criminal
conduct.

7

POINT II
THE TROOPERfS STOP OF THE DEFENDANT TO INFORM HIM OF
THE "LEFT-LANE LAW" WAS A PRETEXT TO CONDUCT AN
INVESTIGATORY STOP WHICH WAS UNSUPPORTED BY REASONABLE
SUSPICION.
At the time that the Defendant-Appellant's vehicle was
stopped, the Trooper making the stop had already been informed
that the vehicle was not stolen.
announced

his

vehicle"

(T. 7)

However, the Trooper had

intention to the dispatcher

to

"go after the

and had even requested that the dispatcher send

someone for backup

(T. 7). It would be unreasonable to presume

that a Highway Patrol Trooper whose intention is to inform a
driver of the "left-lane law" would need to have backup for such
a stop.
The trial court in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law,

and

Order

Denying

Defendant's

Motion

to

Suppress

specifically found that the Trooper had no pre-conceived idea
that the Defendant-Appellant was a drug courier.

Still, the

Trooper's subsequent conduct in investigating the vehicle and its
gas tank and gas gauge cannot support any other conclusion except
that the traffic stop was made as a pretext to conduct a more
detailed investigation for drugs.
Careful reading of 41-7-53, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended,

in light of the

facts

of this

case, makes it

difficult to determine that the Trooper had any reason to suspect
that the Defendant-Appellant was violating the "left-lane law".
Under sub-paragraph (1)(d) of the Statute this was definitely a
roadway designed for one-way traffic since it was the northbound
8

lane

of

the

Interstate

Freeway.

As

long

as

the

Defendant-Appellant was traveling at the normal speed of traffic,
he could lawfully operate his vehicle in the left-hand lane.
Apparently he was doing so at 56 miles per hour and passing two
other slower vehicles.
Under all the factual circumstances of this case, it
can only be concluded that the Trooper's decision to stop the
Defendant-Appellant and discuss with him the "left-lane law" was
a pretext for other investigatory purposes.

Numerous cases have

been decided where a stop has been determined to be pretextual in
nature.

The first "pretext" case was United States v. Lefkovitz,

258 U.S. 452

(1932) wherein the United

states Supreme Court

announced that "an arrest may not be used as a pretext to search
for evidence."

In United States v. Keller, 499 F. Supp 415(1980)

the Defendant was stopped because his vehicle had only one
license plate.

He was then arrested and taken into custody and

searched and stolen credit cards were recovered.
Court

in

that

was pretextual.
(1984)

the

case

determined

In United

prosecution

and

that

the

The Federal

Defendant's

arrest

States v. Millio, 588 F. Supp 45
the defense

stipulated

that the

surveillances of the Defendant were instigated to determine if
the

Defendant

violation.

could

objectively

be

stopped

for

a

traffic

The Defendant was stopped for a traffic violation and

a firearm was recovered.

In the circumstances of that case the

stop was determined to be pretextual.

The firearm was determined

to have been illegally seized and the Defendant was discharged.
9

In United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704
Officer questioned was looking
courier profile.

(11th Cir. 1986) the

for vehicles matching

a drug

He observed the Defendant's car to weave six

inches to the right of the right-hand lane line and then near but
not over the painted center line of the highway.

The stop of the

Defendant's car was found to be pretextual and the conviction was
reversed.

In

In United

States v. Cruz,

581

F.2d

53 5

(5th

Cir. 1978) the Court determined that a part-time Deputy Sheriff
followed a vehicle for one mile and then stopped the vehicle
to advise the driver that he had made an illegal U-turn and that
such turns were dangerous.

The Court found the stop to be a

pretext to investigate for the presence of illegal aliens.
Defendant's were

discharged

and

the

conviction

vacated.

The
In

Amador-Gonzales v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968),
an Officer on a narcotics stakeout watched the Defendant circle a
city block numerous times making sharp left turns which were
executed

illegally.

Th€s narcotics

officer

officers to stop the Defendant's vehicle.

called

for other

The other officers

observed the Defendant driving 3 6 miles per hour in a 30 miles
per hour

zone prior to the

stop.

The

Court

in that case

determined that the traffic stop was used as a pretext for a
narcotics search and suppressed the evidence gained in the search
and discharged the Defendant.

In Taglavore v. United States, 291

F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961) , the officers were given a Warrant of
Arrest to arrest the Defendant for failing to signal and having
faulty brake and signal lights.
10

The Warrant was obtained by a

vice squad officer who had observed the violations the night
before.
Defendant

The officers making the arrest were told that the
was

possession.

likely

The

Ninth

to

have
Circuit

marijuana
Court

cigarettes

in

Taglavore

in

his

pointed

out that it was permissible to search incident to an arrest, but
not vice versa.
In all of the above cited cases, Courts have determined
that traffic stops were pretextual and used merely as a screen
for the investigatory procedures which were the objective of the
arresting officers.

The record in this case can only support the

proposition that Trooper Smith was using the "left-lane law" as
an excuse to stop the Defendant-Appelant's vehicle and conduct
further investigations which would otherwise be unwarranted.
CONCLUSION
Because the officer had no reasonable suspicion to
believe

that

the

Defendant-Appellant

had

committed

a public

offense and because the "traffic stop" was merely a pretext to
conduct

an

investigatory

stop,

the

Defendant-Appellant's

conviction should be reversed and his case should be remanded to
the trial court where the evidence should be ordered suppressed.
Respectfully submitted this -5O I day of October, 1987.

J^JflS^'L. SI
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
110 North Main Street
P.O. Box 623
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-3772
11

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the

above

and

foregoing

BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Mr, David

L. Wilkinson, Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 30
first class postage fully prepaid.
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which is a part of a highway[t and if}. If it finds
[that such] ,the structure [sennet] may not with
safety, withstand vehicles traveling at the speed otherwise permissible under this. chapter, the Department of Transportation .shall determine [and
declare] the maximum speed of vehicles which [sueh]
the structure can withstand, and shall cause or
permit suitable signs stating [seeh] the maximum
speed to be erected and maintained before each end
of [sueh] the structure.
(3) Upon the trial of [any] a person charged with
a violation of this section, proof of [said] the determination .of the maximum speed by the Department
of Transportation and the existence of [said] the
signs [shall] constitute conclusive evidence of the
maximum speed which Jean] may be maintained
with safety (to such] on the bridge or structure.

; highway within [saeh} a distance^** *ftl ™™**fr"**i
; constituting an immediate hazard;
i
[(3) Upon] (c) on a roadway divided! into three
marked lanes for traffic under ,thc applicable rujes
j [applicable thereon]; or
[(4) Upon] (d) on a roadway designed^and, signposted for one-way traffic.
[(b)~ypeft] (2) On all roadways [any] a vehicle
proceeding atj less than the normal speed of, traffic
[at-the-ttmc and plaee] under the existing conditions
[then-existing] shall be [dftven] operated in the righthand lane then available for traffic, or as close as
practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the
roadway, except when overtaking and passing
another vehicle proceeding in the same direction or
when preparing for a left turn at an intersection or
into a private road or driveway. •
'

Section 50. Section Amended.
Section 41-6-51, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is
amended to read*

Section 53. Section Amended. '
Section 41-6-54, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is
amended to read*

41-6-51. Speed contest or exhibition on highway
- Barricade or obstruction.
[(a) No] (1) A person [shall] may not engage in
any motor v vehicle speed contest or exhibition of
speedt on a highway [and no-person shall] or aid or
abet in any [sueh] motor vehicle speed contest or
exhibition on any highway.
[(b) No] (2) A person [sh&U] may not, for the
purpose of faahtating or aiding or as an incident to
any motor vehicle speed contest upon a Jiighway, in
any manner obstruct or place any barricade or
obstruction or assist or participate in placing any
[such] $>arricade or obstruction upon any highway.

41-6-54. Passing vehicles proceeding in opposite
directions.
[Drivers] Operators of vehiclest proceeding in
opposite directions shall pass eaclx other £o .the right
[an^-ttpoflj. „On roadways iavjng ,widtn' for riot
more than one line of traffic in each direction^ each
[dr-tver] operator shall give, to the other at least onehalf of the main traveled portion of the roadway as
nearly as possible.
Section 54. Section Amended.
Section, 4i-$-55, Utah Code sAnnolated 1953,
as last amended by Chapter \j94,, Laws of,l/tah
1985, is amended to read:

Section 51. Section Amended.
Section 41-6-52, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is
amended to read:

41-6-55. Overtaking and passing vehicles
proceeding In same direction!.
The [following rules govern t W overtaking and
41-6-52. Speed violation - Complaint - Civil
passing of vehicles proceeding fa jhe same 4irectio
[T] IS subject to the following provisions:
negligence.
(1) The [dove*] operator of a vehicle overtaking
[(a)] (\} In every charge of violation of any speed
[regulation m this act] provision of this article, the another vehicle proceeding in the same direction
compJaintJr-also] and the summons or notice to shall pass to the left at a safe distance and may not
appesrfr] *hai! specify the speed at which, the defe- again drive to the right side p t t h e roadway until
ndant is alleged to have [dttven] operated a vehicle, safely clear of the overtaken vehicle. „ 'fj «, f also the prima facie speed applicable within the
(2) The [dfiver;] operator of an overtaken vehicle
district or at the location.
shall give way to the right in favor of the overtaking
[(b)] (2} The provisions of this [aet] article decl- vehicle and may not increase the^speed of his vehicle
aring , pnma facie speed limitations [shall not be until completely passed by the ovextakingVehicle. T *
construed to] do not relieve the plaintiff in any civil
(3) On a [read] highway having more than one
action from the butden of proving negligence on the lane in the same direction, the [drive*] operator of a
part of the defendant as the proximate cause of an vehicle traveling in a left lane shall, upon being
accident.
overtaken by another Vehicle in the same lane,' yield
to the over-taking vehicle by^mo'viflg safely to the
Section 52. Section Amended.
right, and may not impede the movement or' free
Section 41-6-53, Utah Code .Annotated 1953,
as ilast amended by Chapter * 207, Laws of Utah flow of traffic in a left lane except: *K T^H^
(a) when overtaking and passing'another .vehicle
1975, is amended to read.
proceeding in the same direction [under • the rules
41-6-53. Duty to operate vehicle on right side of
governing this movement];
roadway - Exceptions.
(b) when preparing to turn left;
[(a) Upon] (1) On all loadways of sufficient
• (c) when ^reasonably necessary in Response r to
width, a vehicle shall be (driven] operated upon the emergency conditions;
right half of the roadway, except [as-feHews]:
(d) to avoid actual or potential traffic moving
'- [(*)] {§} when overtaking and passing another onto the right lane from an /acceleration or merging
vehicle proceeding in the same direction 4under the
lane; or
rules governing [s**eh] that movement;
tlM, * v
(e) when necessary t*> follow r(the -highway] direc~- r£)l fb), when, an obstruction {tx*sts ^making it tion signs' that, direct use of mJane,other than the
necessary to drive] requires operating the vehicle to right lane.
the left of the center of the, roadwayfc-provided any
[(4) Violation of this flection is'Q closq B rmsdeperson ,80 doing], but the operator shall yield the meanefr]
right-of-way to all vehicles traveling in the proper
direction upon the unobstructed portions of the

370
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Addendum page 1 of 3

1

A.

At that time I noticed a vehicle in front of me

2

that bore New York license plates. The number on the license

3

plate was KGY554, had one subject driving.

4

of the license number and as I proceeded to pass the vehicl e

5

I took note

I on the left side, the driver looked over at me and then

6

quickly

7

This action made me rather suspicious so I called our Cedar

looked back away from me and kinda bowed his head

8

dispatch to ask if she could check the NCIC, which is the

9

National Computer, to see if there was a possibility

10

vehicle was stolen.

11

MR. SHUMATE:

^2

Could we hold for a translation

on that, your Honor?

13

14

this

THE COURT:
J

Certainly

MR. SHUMATE:

IS

THE COURT:

Thank you
All right.

16

Q.

(By Mr. Oehler)

17

A.

The time on that was about 2:57.

What happened then?
At 3:09

p.m.

18

Cedar dispatch informed me that the vehicle was not listed

19

as stolen, but due to the suspicious nature and the way

2Q

the subject had reacted when he seen m e , I told Cedar that

21

I was going to go after the vehicle, that I was going to

22

check the vehicle more closely, and I asked if she had anybody

23

in the area that she could send someone to assist me with
I

251

this vehicle
MR. SHUMATE:

Your

Honor, could we hold again for

B Y R O N RAY C H R I S T I A N S E N . J R .
C c f t r i r i c o S H O R T H A N D ft<j»c>ftTKJt
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1

2

j a translation?
I

THE COURT:

3

0

4|

A

5 | on 1-15.
6
7
B
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
IB
19
20
21
22

Certainly.

{By Mr. Oehler)

Tell us what took place then.

At that time I left the Leeds area and started north
At approximately Milepost 49, 1 again encountered

the subject vehicle.

This time the vehicle was travelinq

at 56 miles per hour and it was in the left lane.
Q.

Is Milepost 46 m

A.

Forty-nine.

Q.

Forty-nine.

A.

Yes, it is in Iron County.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Well, I followed the vehicle about 40 seconds --

Cedar?

Is that in Iron County?

What did you see next?

40 to 50 seconds, somewhere like that, but, not a real
long time, in the left lane.

And as we passed two vehicles,

I decided I'd stop this vehicle and explain to him our
left-lane law, give him a warning for traveling in the left
lane and not yielding immediately.

He had a couple opportunities

to get into the right lane even though he had passed a couple
of vehicles.

I decided that I would pull fyim over at that

point and inform him of our left-lane law.
We were in the left when

I activated my red spotlight.

23
The subject yielded immediately, pulled hi^ vehicle to the
24
right and stopped in the emergency lane.
25
MR. SHUMATE:

Could we hold again for translation,
BYRON

RAY C H R I S T I A N S E N . J R .

Ccitr^iio SHOKTHAKO Rtromrtn
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